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Abstract 
 
A major reason for the peripheral treatment of political conflict in established theories of 
urban development derives from the tendency to underplay questions of territory and spatial 
governance. In this paper we examine the implications of territorial discrepancy amongst 
governance arrangements and introduce the notion of ‘urban political dissonance’ in order to 
engage sustained patterns of conflict or incongruity. This focus implies examination of 
strategic action on the part of competing urban interests which may result in policy 
incoherence, institutional manoeuvring in pursuit of divergent objectives, and difficulties in 
finding workable compromise, with potentially significant implications for economic 
development outcomes. An illustrative case study is presented of growth politics in Oxford, 
U.K., where a central and unresolved dilemma over the physical expansion of the city has 
effectively defined the nature of development politics for a generation, leading to ongoing 
political conflict and policy incongruity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In contemporary urban theory the status of political conflict is under debate from varied 
disciplinary perspectives (see GUALINI, 2015). In this paper we seek to illuminate the 
particular importance of territory in the reality of urban political contest and conflict, and to 
contribute to associated theoretical debates. There is scope, we argue, for theories of urban 
politics to engage much more directly with political conflict on the ground and questions of 
territoriality, governmental structure and boundaries which underpin the day-to-day conduct 
of political strategy and manoeuvring, the mobilization of political and institutional interests, 
the dynamics of local political relations and the potential incompatibility of policy positions 
– in many instances the very ‘stuff’ of urban politics and planning. This focus implies 
attention to the strategic activity of urban actors and recognises explicitly the potential for 
dissonance between competing political agendas and interests. Also, as we seek to 
demonstrate, it reopens questions of the significance of government within governance 
(IMRIE and RACO, 1999) and provides an additional inflection on debates regarding the 
ontological value of territorial as compared to non-territorial perspectives and metaphors 
(ALLEN, 2011; ALLEN AND COCHRANE, 2007; ELDEN, 2011; JONAS, 2006, 
MARSTON et al. 2005).   
 
The discussion and analysis is presented in 5 further sections: Section 2 briefly examines 
influential theories of urban and regional governance, politics and planning and establishes 
their respective limits in dealing with issues of political conflict. This derives, it is argued, 
from a tendency to underplay enduring questions of territoriality and spatial governance in 
the respective formulations. We then go on in the following section to consider the nature of 
strategic action and its effects on urban politics and planning, which may result in particular 
4 
 
conditions of ‘urban political dissonance’. Section 4 outlines some of the methodological 
implications of researching dissonance in urban development in general and lays out the 
specifics of our case study analysis in particular, before Section 5 analyses in detail the 
emergence and impact of dissonant politics in Oxfordshire, U.K.. Finally, in the concluding 
Section 6 we offer some necessarily brief reflections on the implications of urban political 
dissonance for the planning and delivery of economic growth and development, as well as 
directions for future research. 
 
2. Territory, Urban Theory and the Question of Dissonance 
Established theories of urban development and politics have generally been preoccupied 
with how particular agendas emerge and become dominant, rather than engaging directly 
with the ongoing discord that is characteristic of many urban political contexts. In the U.S. 
case, for example, growth machine theories (GMT) have emphasised a central unifying 
interest in urban growth reflecting primarily the local dependence of an urban land-based 
elite, including landowners, developers, legal, financial and other interests (see MOLOTCH, 
1976, 1988; LOGAN and MOLOTCH, 1987). Here ‘growth’ emerges as an ‘over-riding 
commonality’ (MOLOTCH, 1976: 310) which effectively trumps other areas of political 
tension and contest. 
 
Regime Coalition Theory (RCT), by way of contrast, explicitly engages the diversity of 
interests and political agendas in urban politics, which form the context for significant 
conflict over local development policy (ELKIN, 1985, 1987; SANDERS and STONE, 1987; 
for reviews see: DAVIES, 2002; IRAZÁBAL, 2009; LAURIA, 1997; MOSSBERGER and 
STOKER, 2001). Here the political task of coalition-building and conflict management in 
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support of policy is central, and is achieved by the establishment of a coalition of interest 
groups held together by shared or overlapping objectives and strategic ‘side payments’ 
(SANDERS and STONE, 1987, 168). From this vantage point ‘the focus in regime analysis 
is on the internal dynamics of coalition building’ (Stone 1989: 5) or informal modes of 
coordination across institutional boundaries (MOSSBERGER and STOKER, 2001: 812) 
and the enduring patterns of cooperation and coordination which result. 
 
Alongside these distinctive analytical approaches to urban politics, normative formulations 
have emerged around the notion of ‘collaborative planning’ (CP), emphasising the 
desirability of communicative action to drive broad-based consensus-building (e.g. 
FORESTER, 1989, 1993; 1999; HEALEY, 1997, 1998; INNES and BOOHER, 2010). 
These models cast the planner as facilitator in communicative processes which seek 
consensus in something approaching Habermas’s ideal speech situation; a situation free of 
other forms of action (dramaturgical, normatively regulated and strategic). The possibilities 
for consensus borne out of such collaborative action are a matter of ensuring the integrity of 
the planning process, regardless of the realpolitik of political relations and budgetary cycles, 
for example. 
 
We should be clear, of course, that the respective emphases in these readings on the 
dominance of urban growth agendas, on patterns of political coalescence and on 
collaborative collective action do not deny the position of politics and political disagreement. 
Indeed the frameworks explicitly allow for competition and conflict: In GMT the 
development and use of land provides the focus of interest formation, competition, conflict 
and coalescence, while control over government, as the site of public resources and decision-
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making processes, represents an arena of struggle between land-based interests; in RCT, as 
MOSSBERGER and STOKER note (2001: 813), ‘cooperation does not imply consensus 
over values and beliefs but participation to realize “small opportunities”’ (STONE 1993, 11). 
Similarly, where CP emphasises potential political conflict it registers the requirement for 
genuinely collaborative processes to recognise and, as far as possible, ameliorate extant 
power-relationships among stakeholders (e.g. HEALEY, 1997: 288). 
 
Our point is that these acknowledgements to political competition and conflict are limited 
and somewhat peripheral to the respective frameworks. GMT reduces urban politics to 
modest forms of ‘growth manoeuvring’ (MOLOTCH, 1988: 40), for example, while RCT 
emphasises the establishment of coalitions held together by selective or purposive incentives 
(STONE, 1993) and the tendency, over time, for regimes to ‘subdue differences and reshape 
the outlook of participants’ (MOSSBERGER and STOKER, 2001: 813). The persistence of 
conflict in CP theories, meanwhile, is taken as evidence of poorly designed or illegitimate 
planning process, which would dissolve in the face of genuinely collaborative processes. In 
each of these influential frameworks, therefore, the question of sustained and debilitating 
political conflict is largely sidelined. 
 
A major reason for the peripheral treatment of political conflict here derives, we contend, 
from the tendency to underplay questions of territory and spatial governance which are at 
the heart of urban politics. Here we might point to Kevin Cox’s (1989, 2013) theorisation of 
the ‘politics of turf’ in the context of capitalist social relations focused on questions of 
collective consumption, inequality, status and use values, within which the state is critically 
implicated. As Cox has argued (1989: 70), a politics of location is inevitable, though its 
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specific forms are contingent upon the variable scale dependencies of actors and interests 
(COX, 1989, 1995, 2013; COX and JONAS, 1993; COX and MAIR, 1989, 1991; JONAS, 
2006). However, two distinct types of politics of location emerge: a class politics of location, 
which expresses the changing balance of power between capital and labour, and a territorial 
politics of location comprising relations and competition between politically organised 
spatial entities. In some contexts, business assumes an important role in aggregating different 
interests into a political consensus. As historic changes in class-based politics have ‘left a 
potentially alienating void in self-understanding and in related concepts of community’ 
(COX and MAIR, 1989: 317) the gap may be filled by local business coalitions offering their 
own version of community. Such ‘pseudo-community’ is partial and unstable, however, 
contributing as it does to ‘weak’ forms of place making and inter-locality competition (COX, 
1995). In other contexts, ‘while local dependence is revealed to be one root of the 
antagonisms, at the same time it provides a basis for the suspension of conflict in favor of a 
solidarity within each locality’ (COX and MAIR, 1989: 307). Here, government and civil 
society play more active roles in ‘strong’ forms of place making and inter-locality 
competition associated with a discourse of territory ‘orchestrated by the growth coalition, 
and facilitated by the spatial structure of the state’ (Cox, 1989: 81). Consequently, 
 
As a result of transformations such as these popular politics in the city is, more often 
than not, experienced as a multiplicity of battles between territorial coalitions, and at 
different scales (Cox, 1989: 82) 
 
From this critical perspective the potential for turf conflict is extended across formal 
territorial boundaries, given the relative autonomy, fragmentation, and differentiation of 
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governmental forms. Dear and Wolch (1989: 13), for example, draw attention to the relative 
autonomy of the local state, and the scope this provides for the identification of 
particularistic interests and consequent conflict. Further, they describe how the specificity 
and uniqueness of territorial organisation in each locale makes it possible to speak of a crisis 
of the locale, reflecting the broader regulatory challenges consequent upon particular 
combinations of economic, political or social conditions, such as severe deindustrialisation 
(or, we might add, severe growth pressures). This may be exacerbated if, for example, 
subsequent governance adjustment to secure social reproduction is impractical, or if separate 
locales undertake unilateral action at the expense of others (op cit: 11). Elsewhere, Storper 
(2014), references the diversity of objectives and mechanisms derived from fragmented 
metropolitan governance, and consequent limitations on the development of local 
governance forms: 
 
Metropolitan governance is shaped by the strong interdependencies within urban areas, 
combined with the fragmented geography and roles of the agencies that govern them. 
Fragmentation is not an accident; it responds to underlying differences in the 
preferences of constituencies, the scale of efficient provision of public goods and 
regulation, and the bundling of attributes of the city into jurisdictions. This is why 
governance moves forward in a haphazard way, through tinkering (Storper, 2014: 115) 
 
These various readings of territorial politics and spatial governance collectively emphasise 
the potential for ‘territorial discrepancy’1 amongst governance arrangements, highlighting 
inter alia the lack of compatibility of ideological commitments, political constituencies, policy 
perspectives, representational forms, resources, programmes and mechanisms across 
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territorial boundaries. As such they stand in marked contrast to the ‘flat ontologies’ of recent 
network or assemblage readings of governance concerned with the congealing of power 
within networks and the processes by which actors and interests are enrolled within new 
governance arrangements (e.g. ALLEN AND COCHRANE, 2007). These alternative 
perspectives are open to the strengths and weaknesses of non-scalar ontologies revealed in 
recent debates in human geography (ALLEN, 2011; ELDEN, 2011; JONAS, 2006, 
MARSTON et al. 2005), but arguably divert attention away from territorial discrepancies 
that continue to manifest in urban and regional politics. For our purposes the particular 
implications of territorial arrangements are central. Yet beyond a broad acknowledgement of 
the potential for conflict arising from territorial discrepancy, there has to date been very 
limited examination of the distinctive political processes and outcomes consequent upon 
divergent territorial arrangements. 
 
How, then, might we approach the status of discord, disharmony and inaction within urban 
political theory, and the political scleroses and policy stases which emerge as a consequence? 
To what extent are we able to engage theoretically with sustained patterns of conflict or 
incongruity in urban politics and development that go beyond growth manoeuvring, which 
disrupt or effectively disable coalescence around shared objectives, and which frustrate 
aspirations for collaboration? In responding to these questions we turn to the notion of 
political dissonance, broadly denoting ‘…a fractious, institutionally rigid, and quite unresponsive 
political system’ (KRIEGER, 2002: 335), but more particularly concerned with the 
institutionalisation of contradictory visions or agendas and the degree to which ‘core 
components of institutionalized politics combine’ (KRIEGER, 2002: 337). To date the 
question of political dissonance has predominantly been investigated in dysfunctional, often 
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post-colonial global-regional or nation-state contexts riven by sharp socio-economic and 
cultural discontinuities and competing political and religious doctrines2. Here, 
 
Dissonant politics pivots around the institutional and ideological space that distances 
contending societal organizations both from the state and from one another. The 
competition by the leaders of these organizations for popular support hinders the 
efforts of any one group to impose ideological hegemony, while relative autonomy and 
elite competition facilitate both the state’s manipulation of competing elites and the 
latter’s efforts to manipulate the state. Still, it is usually the state that prevails. By 
encouraging contending elites to constantly negotiate particular policy questions or to 
debate this or that symbolic issue, the state enhances its room for manoeuvre and thus 
benefits from the spectre of institutionalized conflict. Divide and rule and elite 
accommodation are thus two sides of the same coin (BRUMBERG, 2001: 384) 
 
Clearly there is considerable distance to negotiate in adapting this very particular formulation 
to the realm of urban political theory. Yet some sense of the potential value here emerges in 
Brumberg’s description of ‘dissonant institutionalization’ which 
 
… obtains when the state has abetted the institutionalization of contradictory visions 
of authority in organizations, parties, or groups that maintain a degree of autonomy or 
at the least some capacity to define preferences independently of the state 
(BRUMBERG, 2001: 384) 
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This resonates with long-established theoretical concerns regarding the structure and relative 
autonomy of the local state (COCKBURN, 1977; DUNCAN and GOODWIN, 1988), as 
well as ongoing changes to the ‘representational regime’ in the sphere of local and regional 
economic development since the 1980s (JESSOP, 1990; JONES, 1999; PECK, 1995;). It 
also appeals to ongoing questions of urban governance including territoriality, relational 
autonomy and institutional dynamics. Indeed, the various attempts in the U.K. and 
elsewhere over the past 30 years to engage private sector interests in urban and regional 
governance and the ongoing rescaling of local and regional economic development, latterly 
through the 2010-2015 Coalition and current Conservative Government’s turn to ‘localism’, 
have provided fertile institutional ground for contrasting ‘visions of authority’. This, in turn, 
throws the spotlight onto the nature of such visions and the strategic actions through which 
they are pursued, which we take up in more detail in the next section. 
 
 
3. Urban Political Dissonance and Strategic Action 
The key features of urban political dissonance are briefly summarised in Table 1 and compared 
with GMT, RCT and CP. Most important here, and in contrast to the varying political 
motives animating GMT, RCT and CP, a concern for political dissonance requires 
examination of strategic action. As we have discussed elsewhere (ref removed), such a focus 
derives from strands of social theory which emphasise not the inter-subjective 
communicative action that can promote political consonance, but distinctly different forms 
of action at the level of the individual. In particular, ‘teleological’ or ‘strategic’ action occurs 
when one actor seeks an end or brings about a desired state in relation to one or more other 
actors by choosing a strategic model through which to interpret a given situation, and where 
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a calculation is made of the success of achieving the desired end from the reactions of other 
actors. It also implies a concern for framing, or ‘the ways in which social actors use 
competing or convergent frames to (re)construct a specific cultural orientation which 
favours and justifies their own policy positions’ (TRIANDAFYLLIDOU and FOTIOU, 
1998: paragraph 2.11). As TRIANDAFYLLIDOU and FOTIOU suggest, a focus on 
framing may contribute in understanding policy-making processes by illustrating how actors 
emphasise specific policy matters and offer a particular interpretation of events, and ‘how 
competing interpretations and perspectives may lead to dramatically different policy designs’ 
(TRIANDAFYLLIDOU and FOTIOU, 1998, op cit). Such strategic action might be 
contrasted with ‘normatively regulated action’, where members of a social group conform in 
their actions to a set of predefined common values and each individual complies with the 
group's norms, and ‘dramaturgical action’ which describes the presentation of the self to an 
audience by constituting a particular behaviour or image (PHELPS and TEWDWR-JONES, 
2000: 116-117). 
 
Strategic action implies that actors calculate and implement their strategies based on their 
perceptions of their own interests, the shifting and uneven playing field of opportunities and 
constraints that confront them, their monitoring of the reactions of other actors, and the 
anticipated and unanticipated outcomes which result. They may then revise and adapt their 
strategies (and perhaps their identities) accordingly3. Individual interests act strategically in 
pursuit of their respective ideas, continually calculating the prospects of success or failure for 
particular actions in a dynamic context, the likely responses of other actors and the 
appropriate ‘tactics’ to deploy in developing circumstances; these might include all sorts of 
political and institutional manoeuvring which might contribute to urban political dissonance: 
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Disagreement, delay, division, disruption and diversion are obvious potential elements of 
urban politics, for example, as much as coalition-building, growth manoeuvring and 
instrumental control. 
 
Strategic action may, therefore, result in urban political dissonance. This represents more 
than occasional disagreement over particular issues as they emerge, however, comprising 
sustained, institutionalised conflict marked by contradictory visions and policy incongruity. 
With regard to the political process, urban political dissonance may reflect fundamental 
differences of ideology, objectives, strategy or policy, or – more likely, in the context of 
territorial governance – a combination of some or all of these levels. Urban political 
dissonance may emerge, for example, over multiple and cross-cutting issues including, inter 
alia: Diverse conceptions of the nature of the problems faced; the appropriate roles to be 
played by particular governance actors; the policy objectives to be set; patterns of political 
leadership and engagement; the scope and overall direction of strategic response; associated 
social and spatial implications; the deployment of resources; and the content, conduct and 
implementation of spatial policy. These differences lead to significant difficulty or indeed 
inability to achieve effective compromise or to find some form of workable resolution to 
policy dilemmas, such that tension is likely to be ongoing and at times wholly debilitating. 
They are also likely to find expression in contradictory and/or incoherent policy responses 
amongst diverse actors. Section 5 moves on below to describe an empirical example of these 
dissonant forms and to illustrate patterns of strategic action from which they emerge. Prior 
to this, however, we briefly consider some of the broad methodological implications of 
undertaking research in dissonant contexts, and detail the research undertaken for the 
current paper. 
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Table 1: Key characteristics of Growth Machine Theory, Regime Coalition Theory, Collaborative Planning and Urban Political 
Dissonance 
 
 
 Growth Machine Theory Regime Theory (developed 
from Mossberger & Stoker 
2001: 829) 
Collaborative planning Urban Political Dissonance 
Underlying theories Structuralist political 
economy 
Pluralist theories of local state Theory of communicative 
action 
Frame theory and strategic action 
Motivations Unifying interest in ‘growth’ 
(variously defined) 
Shared Incentives The possibilities for 
intersubjective understanding 
and compromise from 
communicative action 
The possibilities of domination 
through strategic action 
Form of political 
leadership 
Dominant land-based elite Partnership or coalescence 
based on informal networks as 
well as formal relationships 
Political and planning elites as 
enablers 
Institutional manoeuvring in pursuit 
of differentiated agendas 
Characteristic political 
process 
Elite agenda-setting. 
Instrumental control of local 
government. 
Collaboration based 
distribution of small 
opportunities 
Absence of politics or 
technocratic agenda-setting  
Established and sustained pattern of 
conflict/tension. Evidence of 
strategic action to delay, disrupt and 
reduce prospects for agreement, or 
diversion to manage 
conflict/contradiction. 
Policy form/direction Growth as ‘over-riding 
commonality’ 
Identifiable policy agenda and 
purpose, drawn from regime 
membership 
Reflects status quo interests Identifiable evidence of contradictory 
or incoherent policy agendas or 
programmes. 
Policy outcomes Dominant growth agenda; 
potential competition 
amongst land-based 
interests; ‘growth 
manoeuvring’ 
Longstanding pattern of 
cooperation 
Possibility of outcomes 
deferred indefinitely 
Difficulty/inability to compromise or 
find workable resolution 
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4. Methodological Note 
 
In common with analyses of growth machines and urban regimes, research on urban 
political dissonance is naturally oriented towards case study methodology, given the focus on 
internal and conflictual political dynamics. Criticism has emerged, though, in the urban 
governance literature on the conduct of case study research noting, for example, a 
multiplicity of competing concepts, a lack of methodological guidelines in the dominant 
frameworks, a tendency to interview only the ‘usual suspects’, and the costs and time 
associated with such detailed qualitative investigation (GISSENDANNER, 2003: 664-666). 
The result is a lack of comparability across cases resulting from ‘correctable problems in 
research designs: an overdominance of deductive approaches; the lack of explicit 
methodological guidelines, and the less than rigorous application of what has become a 
multitude of overlapping theoretical concepts’ (GISSENDANNER, 2003: 664). However, 
Gissendanner also notes that the initial studies of urban regimes were inductive, deriving 
general rules based on detailed findings from individual cases (see STONE, 1989; 
SANDERS and STONE, 1987) and we adopt a similar standpoint here as a starting point 
for analyses of urban political dissonance. Clearly the broader usefulness of the approach in 
terms of stimulating comparative analysis is contingent on (i) some level of consistency in 
conceptualisation and (ii) the identification of ‘general structural characteristics’ 
(GISSENDANNER, 2003: 670) or classification of ‘intergovernmental arrangements or 
economic categories’ (MOSSBERGER and STOKER, 2001: 816) which may impact on a 
range of dependent variables. The simple point being that urban political dissonance may be 
more likely where there are different patterns of political control across neighbouring local 
authorities, where economic growth threatens existing administrative and urban/rural 
boundaries, where there are diverse economic contexts, and where more than one tier of 
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government is implicated. These characteristics might then inform the development and 
testing of hypotheses and the construction of comparative analyses. 
 
As an initial contribution to research on urban political dissonance the case study reported 
here draws on wide-ranging methods over an extended time-period. Well over 70 research 
interviews have been conducted throughout the past 4 years across a range of projects and 
topic areas, both as part of funded research projects and through personal unfunded 
research. One of the authors (name) undertook participant observation through involvement 
in consultancy work for Oxford City Council’s ‘Economic Development and Growth 
Strategy’ (OSP, 2013) and as Project Manager for the Oxford/Oxfordshire ‘City-Deal 
Evidence Base’ October-December 2012 which underpinned the successful City-Deal bid 
submitted to Government in January 2013. Additionally research incorporated extensive 
non-participant observation of local authority committee meetings (both live or webcast) 
across the Oxfordshire district councils throughout 2011-2015, substantial documentary 
review and a daily review of the local press. Overall, the authors have developed an extensive 
personal archive of materials and experience drawing on a variety of perspectives from 
interviewees and on multiple research projects over a relatively lengthy period of research 
activity. 
 
As suggested, some further brief comment is also worthwhile here on the general issue of 
research conduct in dissonant contexts. Given the primary focus on regions of significant 
political tension (or even active violence), research on political dissonance has had to 
confront settings where traditional ethical codes for research conduct are called into 
question. Empirical investigation in these cases may, for example, require a degree of 
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closeness and trust between researcher and subject which elsewhere might be seen to 
jeopardise the independence of the researcher and the research process. In certain 
circumstances researchers may be under very close scrutiny and forensic examination of 
their identity and motives, requiring them to demonstrate that their presence is ‘orthogonal’ 
to the issue at hand and also to deploy honesty, friendship and humour in the research 
process (see MARCHAIS, 2013). Within the realm of urban politics the researcher is 
obviously less likely, in most circumstances, to face challenges to their personal security or 
such heightened sensitivity to their particular motivations. There may be parallel concerns, 
however, regarding the establishment of trust in the research process, the maintenance of 
academic independence, the generation of rigorous empirical evidence, the negotiation of 
informed consent and the potential influence of the researcher in the field. Questions of 
appropriate dissemination activity and increasing pressures to extend the impact of social 
scientific research may also take on additional salience in dissonant political contexts, where 
respondents may be concerned about the exposure of particular viewpoints or actions. In 
light of these issues the authors have sought to be open with respondents regarding their 
research objectives, their emerging interpretation of events and their own particular views on 
policy outcomes. They have built relationships with numerous individuals over an extended 
period and thereby established some level of trust, which has undoubtedly been important in 
opening up issues and controversies which otherwise might easily remain undisturbed. A 
sense of integrity, combined with a level of understanding and humour, is clearly helpful in 
conducting such research. 
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5. Political Dissonance in Oxford and Oxfordshire 
 
(i) The growth context in Oxford and Oxfordshire 
The city of Oxford is an international brand, as a global seat of education, learning and 
research and an iconic tourist destination. Situated about 60 miles to the north-west of 
London, Oxford is a northern outpost of the South-East region of England and a dynamic 
hub of the U.K. knowledge-based economy (KBE). With a population of around 152,000 
the city is a strong sub-regional centre which contributes £4.7bn annually to the UK 
economy (OXFORD STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 2013: 3) and has the highest levels of 
business growth in the county of Oxfordshire. Together with the wider county, the area is a 
centre of engineering and scientific excellence, with one of the most substantial, distinctive 
and important collections of research-based, high-value business activities in Europe (SQW 
2013). It is at the heart of the science and high-tech economy that the U.K. Government 
identifies as the centrepiece of national economic recovery. The leading clusters in the 
Oxfordshire KBE include high-growth sectors such as biosciences and medical research, 
space and satellite technologies, cryogenics, and advanced automotive engineering. There are 
additional strengths in digital information management, cyber-security, publishing, green 
construction, professional and business services, and culture/creative industries. In many 
respects the area has rich potential for growth, with world-leading research institutions 
backed by significant public-sector investment, dynamic and varied KBE clusters, strong 
spin-out activities, and good links to both London and Heathrow Airport. 
 
Looking back over recent decades, however, Oxfordshire as a whole has grown rather less 
than might be anticipated in comparison with other high-tech areas in the UK. Between 
1980 and 2005, for example, Oxfordshire’s GVA per capita grew in line with the national 
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average, while Cambridgeshire’s figure grew at 2½ times the national rate (see WHILE et al, 
2004 for useful background here). Comparisons with some other areas in the South-East 
region over this period are even more notable, as Figure 1 illustrates. 
 
Figure 1: Gross Value Added (GVA) Estimates for NUTS 3 Areas (million euros, 2000 prices) 
 
 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics estimates 
 
 
 
The reasons for this are complex: While high-tech spin-out activity in Oxfordshire compares 
very well against other leading areas (LAWTON SMITH and HO, 2006), subsequent 
consolidation into medium-sized and particularly larger-scale enterprises has been less 
apparent. There is some concern here that despite the proximity of London, venture capital 
funding has been conservative and short-term, with insufficient institutional backing (SQW, 
2013). Foreign Direct Investment into Oxfordshire has also been comparatively low, with 
only 3% of South East region FDI jobs locating in Oxfordshire between 1999 and 2010. 
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This compares with 13% in Berkshire, 16% in Surrey, 13% in Hampshire and 15% in 
Buckinghamshire (figures provided by South East England Development Agency, 2012). In 
terms of the leading global standards, the Oxfordshire high-tech cluster remains relatively 
small scale and rather disparate, with concomitant implications for the profile and 
performance of the constituent sectors. Additionally, there are structural constraints: For 
historical reasons (e.g. location on former military bases and UK Atomic Energy Authority 
sites) key elements of the Oxfordshire KBE are scattered across the county in a largely semi-
rural context, resulting in demonstrable infrastructural shortfall and a lack of integrated 
planning (see refs removed). The growth prospects of the Oxfordshire KBE therefore face 
significant challenges in terms of infrastructure provision, and there are also major issues of 
housing availability and affordability, the variety and location of property for employment 
use, and skills shortages. 
 
Housing availability and affordability in Oxford, in particular, is a key structural challenge. 
The city of Oxford is the least affordable housing location nationally outside of London 
based on the ratio of average incomes to house prices, a factor almost universally highlighted 
by employers and stakeholders during the development of Oxford City Council’s current 
Economic Growth Strategy (OXFORD STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 2013). The rate of 
house-building in the County fell year-on-year after 2006 so that in 2010/11 a total of 1,600 
houses were built in Oxfordshire, the lowest annual level of house building since 1971 (from 
when records are available). Based on extant local plans in 2012, household growth at 
Oxford city (2011-31) was projected at 9% (5200 households), while planned household 
growth in smaller towns about 15 miles outside of the city was much higher, with Bicester to 
the north of the county projected at 52% (6600) and Science Vale/Didcot to the south at 
21 
 
63% (13,000). This proposed pattern of housing delivery would be unlikely to have any 
material impact on problems of availability and affordability in the city. In addition, housing 
supply is seen as a very significant barrier to the operation of the labour market, with 
associated implications for travel-to-work patterns and infrastructure pressures, especially 
given that over half of Oxford’s workforce is drawn from outside of the city mainly from the 
adjacent districts and the rest of the county beyond the greenbelt. Thus we encounter the 
conditions for a pattern of territorial discrepancy which has been emerging for several 
decades. 
 
(ii) The roots of political dissonance 
The argument we set out here is that planning for growth in Oxfordshire has been marked 
by characteristic features of urban political dissonance: Sustained patterns of conflict and 
tension; strategic action to delay, disrupt and reduce prospects for agreement; contradictory 
and incoherent policy agendas or programmes; and difficulty or inability to find compromise 
or workable policy resolution. In particular, for the past 35 years or so development planning 
in Oxfordshire has been marked by an evolving policy dilemma regarding the growth and 
physical expansion of Oxford city, which has had critical implications for planning policy in 
the county and for the growth prospects of the city and the sub-region. The roots of this 
dilemma are historical, reaching back at least to Greenbelt designation around the city in 
1955 and particularly to the conservationist stance of Oxfordshire County Council (OXON 
CC) planning policy in the 'Structure Plan' era from the late-1970s (see further below). But it 
is also, as we demonstrate below, deeply territorial given the sharp urban-rural contrast 
which characterises the County, the fragmented and strongly differentiated context of local 
government structures after boundary reorganisation in 1974 (and indeed the preceding 
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highly fragmented local government context), and the emerging territorial discrepancy 
consequent upon economic and population growth set against the background of stubborn 
local government boundaries. 
 
A key starting point here is the structure and local plan system introduced in the early 1970s, 
with a formal requirement for district-wide local plans from 1991. In ‘shire’ (non-
metropolitan) counties the development plan consisted of the county structure plan together 
with district-wide local plans. In Oxfordshire, eight versions of the Structure Plan were 
produced, starting with the original adopted in 1979, with the last alteration being adopted in 
2005. 
 
 
Figure 2: Oxfordshire County and Districts 
 
 
Source: Oxfordshire County Council, http://www.oxfordshire.gov.uk/cms/public-site/direct-
access-equipment-map 
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The framing of County spatial and growth policy may be judged from the Oxfordshire 
Structure Plan in 1996 where the emphasis on restraint was quite explicit: 
 
Policy G1 (General): The general strategy is to protect the environment, character and 
agricultural resources of the County by restraining the overall level of development. 
The country towns of Banbury, Bicester, Didcot and Witney will be the preferred 
locations for new development. Elsewhere in the County, development, and 
consequent expansion of population, will be limited (OXFORDSHIRE COUNTY 
COUNCIL, 1996) 
 
This was allied with specific policies on employment locations and housing which 
reinforced the focus on the country towns and the policy of general restraint elsewhere, 
including in Oxford city. Indeed, despite a gradual acknowledgement of the city's primary 
function in the sub-region, the final version of the Structure Plan in 2005 clearly reflects 
the legacy of the established country-towns strategy: 
 
2.7 The Plan reflects Oxford’s central role in the life of the County. The County 
Council wants to see Oxford thrive as a first class vibrant city, modern in outlook with 
a diverse economy. The Plan promotes Oxford’s role as a sub-regional centre for 
shopping, leisure and cultural activities. Oxford will continue to build on its strengths – 
education, health and related research and development activities…  
2.8 This does not mean that Oxford should grow unchecked, so as to damage its 
heritage and landscape setting and increase pressure on transport and other services. 
Because of the substantial imbalance between jobs and workforce in Oxford, the 
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overall growth of employment in the city will continue to be limited. Land is available 
within the city to support the development of employment sectors that need to be 
located there. Other activities will be encouraged to continue to locate outside Oxford. 
Support is given for small-scale development which helps to maintain the diversity of 
the Oxford economy (OXFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL, 2005) 
 
However, Oxford City Council had long opposed the country-towns strategy, framing an 
alternative ‘central Oxfordshire’ focus directed towards the planned expansion of the city. 
The Planning Services Business Manager noted in a report to the City Council’s Executive 
Board in 2004, for example: 
 
Members will recall that Oxford City Council has supported a Central Oxfordshire 
approach to development for over 20 years. It had been argued that it is more logical 
to put development in and around Oxford, which forms the hub of the County and 
would reduce the need to travel. The City Council has never formally supported the 
structure plan's ‘country towns strategy‘, which says most development should be 
located in Banbury, Bicester, Didcot and Witney (OXFORD CITY COUNCIL, 2004) 
 
This central dilemma over the growth of the city has by now marked planning policy in 
Oxfordshire for at least three decades. It has also been sharpened by the fragmented local 
government landscape in the County, the very tight boundary at the edge of the city 
reinforced by Greenbelt designation, and major political differences across the 5 county 
districts - Oxford City Council (OCC), South Oxfordshire District Council (SODC), Vale of 
the White Horse District Council (VOWH), West Oxfordshire District Council (WODC) 
25 
 
and Cherwell District Council (CDC) - as well as with Oxfordshire County Council 
(OxonCC) (see Figure 2). During this period OCC has been predominantly Labour-led, 
while SODC, WODC, VOWH, CDC and OxonCC have been largely majority or minority 
Conservative-controlled, albeit with some periods which have diverted from this overall 
pattern in particular districts4. The dilemma has persisted despite the fact that the Labour 
Government’s Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 brought to an end the structure 
plan era, to be replaced by regional planning and an emerging regional spatial strategy – the 
South East Plan (SEP) – developed by the South East England Regional Assembly, which 
was subsequently adopted in 2009 (SEERA, 2009). This adopted a central Oxfordshire focus 
and called for sustainable urban extensions to a number of county urban areas including 
Oxford, as well as a selective review of the Oxford Green Belt. It was absolutely explicit in 
setting a new policy direction, stating in Paragraph 22.5 that: 
 
The settlement pattern of the sub-region will change over the Plan period. Oxford 
itself will be allowed to grow physically and economically in order to accommodate its 
own needs, contribute to those in the wider region and help maintain its world-class 
status (SEERA, 2009) 
 
Despite this re-scaling of the response and the implicit acknowledgment of territorial 
discrepancy, in the event the SEP was almost immediately removed with the revocation of 
regional spatial strategies under the Coalition Government from 2010, to be replaced by 
district-level Local Plans under the rubric of ‘localism’. The nascent settlement over the city 
expansion that might have followed the adoption of the SEP was effectively undermined. 
 
(iii) Urban Political Dissonance I: Planning for housing at the urban edge 
26 
 
Perhaps the clearest expression of territorial discrepancy and consequent political dissonance 
concerns the question of housing development at the edge of Oxford city. In particular we 
examine the area south of Grenoble Road on the south-east fringe of the city (see Figure 3). 
Owned by the City Council and Magdalen College (one of the constituent colleges of the 
University of Oxford) the site has been identified by OCC for many years as a potential 
urban extension to meet the city’s pressing requirement for housing and employment land, 
accommodating possibly in excess of 4,000 homes. Development here has been framed 
explicitly by OCC in terms of a response to the city’s housing crisis arguing in favour of 
Grenoble Road as the so-called ‘South of Oxford Special Development Area’ (SOSDA): 
 
The City Council has consistently argued the sustainability benefits of locating housing 
close to Oxford and the very significant contribution that this could make to meeting 
the pressing housing needs of Oxford and the wider sub-region. Oxford is an 
inherently sustainable location for housing, because of its well established public 
transport and cycle networks, its employment opportunities and its social infrastructure 
made up of extensive retail, health, leisure, cultural and community provision. The City 
Council has therefore supported SOSDA and the potential contribution that a further 
4,000 new homes could make in the longer-term to the pressing housing need in 
Oxford, which cannot be accommodated within its tight administrative boundaries. 
(OCC submission to SODC Core Strategy Examination, 12.5.2011) 
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Figure 3: Grenoble Road area 
 
 
 
 
Source: South Oxfordshire Local Plan 2031 Refined options Stage 2, February 2015, p.43 
(SODC, 2015) 
 
 
However, issues of territory are foremost here. The site is located within the SODC 
administrative boundary and SODC has consistently opposed the principle of development 
at the site, which is designated green belt. The question of urban extension has thus been 
framed in wholly contrasting terms by OCC and SODC as respectively a response to 
structural housing crisis or as protection of the greenbelt. Moreover, some sense of the 
institutional manoeuvring consequent upon these competing agendas can be gleaned from 
the councils’ responses to the SEP as it evolved from 2006 to 2009. In March 2006 SEERA 
published the draft SEP, which incorporated two alternatives for housing growth in central 
Oxfordshire, namely: (i) growth at Didcot, Wantage/Grove, Bicester and within the built up 
area of Oxford; or (ii) an urban extension to Oxford with a review of the Green Belt. The 
draft plan proposed keeping the Oxford Green Belt unchanged and rejected the urban 
extension option. However, the associated Examination in Public (EiP) for the SEP did 
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include consideration of an urban extension to Oxford, which SODC opposed on the 
grounds of incursion into the Oxford greenbelt, a point reflected in its subsequent ‘South of 
Oxford Urban Extension’ public consultation document in July 2008: ‘we oppose this 
proposal for an urban extension into the greenbelt and will continue to oppose it if the 
modifications to the South East Plan retain the proposal’. In 2007 the EiP Panel’s report was 
published, recommending that both options were pursued and including a Strategic 
Development Area (SDA) with a notional allowance of 4000 dwellings to the south of 
Oxford. The Panel recommended that the additional 4000 homes be split between OCC and 
SODC based on more detailed work. It also recommended that the implications of the 
urban extension should be tested through a Sustainability Appraisal and an Environmental 
Impact Assessment, though in the event these were not undertaken by SODC. Nonetheless, 
the SEP, published in May 2009, included multiple references to SOSDA and was 
subsequently legally challenged by SODC, where the council cabinet member for Planning, 
argued: 
 
We're totally opposed to development on this green belt land in South Oxfordshire. 
Oxford City Council, backed by the Government, wants to expand the city into South 
Oxfordshire without justification. The city should use underdeveloped land within its 
own boundaries to build housing, instead of trying to commandeer a large area of 
greenbelt that provides the unique setting for Oxford and contains some beautiful 
South Oxfordshire villages (OXFORD MAIL, 15 June 2009) 
 
The challenge resulted in the withdrawal of the SDA from the SEP (though the additional 
4000 houses remained as part of the overall housing target for the South-East region). 
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However, the issue became moot following the revocation of regional spatial strategies into 
2010. Meanwhile, SODC did not include the SDA in the preparation of the SODC Core 
Strategy between 2008-11, or make provision for any of the proposed 4000 homes. The 
issue has continued to cause controversy, however. The OCC Economic Growth Strategy 
(OSP, 2012) and the ‘Oxfordshire Innovation Engine’ report (SQW, 2013) both identified 
Grenoble Road as a location to meet the city’s chronic need for housing and employment 
growth. Most recently the publication of a new Oxfordshire Strategic Housing Market 
Assessment (‘SHMA’, GL HEARN, 2014) identified a need for some 30,000 new homes for 
the city in the period to 2031, while the existing capacity within the city boundary was 
assessed at around 7-8,000 homes. In light of this the SODC Local Plan is subject to review 
to reflect this latest assessment of housing need. The City Council continues to promote the 
Grenoble Road site for development and to argue in favour of overall green belt review in 
light of the strategic planning context. Additionally, in Summer 2014, OCC sought a 
potential partnership with adjoining landowners at Grenoble Road who confirmed in 
principle that they wish to progress an urban extension in the area, and suggested that they 
may submit a planning application to SODC for the development of the site. OCC also 
submitted a consultation response in 2014 to SODC’s renewed Local Plan consultation 
process setting out their case for building at least 4,000 new homes close to Oxford 
(OXFORD MAIL, 2014b). 
 
The experience at Grenoble Road is redolent with the notion of urban political dissonance. 
The conflict between OCC and SODC over the future of this site reflects clearly 
contradictory policy agendas and a straightforward inability to find compromise or workable 
resolution over a sustained period of time. The respective authorities have acted strategically 
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in support of their competing agendas, adopting a variety of techniques and manoeuvres to 
sustain their positions. Indeed, there is a sense in which the opposition has become 
implacable; it is noteworthy, for example, that even when the SEP had been effectively 
revoked and the Government’s Treasury Solicitor indicated that there was nothing for legal 
challenges to quash or remit, SODC did not withdraw its legal challenge to the SDA, so that 
the issue remains unresolved. The proposed Sustainability Appraisal and Environmental 
Impact Assessment have also not been carried out. OCC, on the other hand, have been 
persistent keeping the issue alive through various means. Altogether, the experience in this 
case is highly suggestive of strategic action on the part of SODC to delay, disrupt and reduce 
prospects for agreement, whether or not the case for development at this site is seen as 
appropriate. The result, perhaps unsurprisingly, is a sense of tension and political strain 
played out regularly in the local press regarding the potential expansion of the city, and little 
sense of any serious and convincing engagement with the housing affordability crisis that is 
clearly evident. 
 
(iv) Urban Political Dissonance II: The Oxford-Oxfordshire City-Deal 
In 2011-12 a programme of ‘City-Deals’ was introduced by the then U.K. Coalition 
Government to extend decentralisation to the eight largest English cities outside of London, 
with the aim to foster long-term economic prosperity and growth (see CORE CITIES, 
2011). Bespoke City-Deals were agreed between central government (Cabinet Office and 
DCLG) and the respective cities and their wider economic areas in 2012, incorporating a 
variety of enhanced powers, resources, financial instruments and organisational forms, 
including in some cases new combined authorities (for further details see CABINET 
OFFICE, 2012). This first wave of City-Deals was finalised in September 2012 and was 
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followed in October by a government invitation to a further 20 cities and their wider areas to 
negotiate for a second wave. Oxford-Oxfordshire was the 11th area in Wave 2 to agree a 
City-Deal, finally signed by the Deputy Prime Minister on January 30th 2014. 
 
From the outset it was apparent that the central focus of the Oxford-Oxfordshire City-Deal 
bid would be on enhancing the performance of the KBE in Oxfordshire, and especially 
responding to the need for improved connectivity across the county. This was particularly 
the case given the perceived importance of proximity and networking in innovation and 
commercialisation processes, and the geographical dispersion of the hi-tech clusters, with 
publishing concentrated predominantly in Oxford; motorsport/advanced engineering across 
north- and west-Oxfordshire and into Northamptonshire; biosciences in and around Oxford 
and in southern Oxfordshire; and space science and cryogenics focused mainly around 
Harwell and Culham in the ‘Science Vale’ area (see reference removed for details of the 
development of Science Vale). There was also increasing recognition of the potential for 
cross-cluster working as the basis for ongoing dynamism and innovation. Hence, 
transportation and digital infrastructure improvements were seen as critical, particularly in 
the light of existing capacity issues and areas of network stress in the road transportation 
system. The central theme of the City-Deal bid became a ‘knowledge-spine’ connecting 
Harwell and Culham in the south, Oxford in the centre and Begbroke Science Park and 
Bicester to the north, via a package of transportation improvements and four new 
innovation hubs. Additionally, the Deal incorporated ambitious claims of nearly 19,000 new 
high-value jobs, a further 31,400 in construction, the delivery of over 500 new 
apprenticeships along with increased funding for skills training, and the ‘accelerated 
construction’ of houses. Here, the City-Deal document states that a more strategic and 
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ambitious approach towards housing growth is ‘essential to the future of the knowledge 
economy in the County’. It therefore included a commitment to accelerate the delivery of 
7,500 homes through a combined Oxfordshire Housing Programme by 2018. This 
represented, it was claimed, a 72% increase in the number of homes delivered by 2018 
against the previous forecast, with 36% of this housing planned to be affordable (OXFORD 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 2014). The Deal also incorporated an explicit commitment 
to deliver the necessary sites to meet the housing needs that would be outlined in the 
emerging SHMA. However, despite the general acknowledgement of the importance of 
housing provision to future growth the City-Deal patently did not set out to address the 
scale of the housing crisis in Oxfordshire or to face the intractable problems of housing 
allocations. The ‘accelerated delivery’ incorporated no previously unallocated sites or 
housing numbers, and the scale of delivery under consideration here was very limited in the 
face of structural housing shortage. 
 
The focus on improved connectivity as the foundation for hi-tech expansion clearly reflected 
moves to foreground the twin themes of innovation and economic growth in framing the 
future development of the county. Key County Council officers leading the City-Deal bid 
process were explicit in framing discussions in these terms, rather than introducing housing 
questions directly into a discussion about ‘economic’ growth. Some sense of the approach 
here may be gleaned from the summary of a senior County Council officer in November 
2013, who argued: 
 
The overarching objective is around economic growth and innovation… Once this 
overall direction is in place, then housing, transport and skills become enablers rather 
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than significant in themselves. The significance of that is that if I come to you and say 
‘do you want 500 houses built next to you?’ the answer will be ‘no, why would I?’ But 
if you say ‘do you want your kids in the next generation to have a future here and have 
somewhere to live because it’s so unaffordable right now?’, then that’s a different 
conversation. So the innovation-economic growth is the vision of what you want to 
do, and the housing, which is where all the arguments are between the various districts 
and the county, becomes the support. It’s like being back to World War I trenches if 
you jump straight into Grenoble Road and you slug it out saying ‘yes’ or ‘no way’ and 
all that – but you have no context for the discussion. It’s just: ‘We don’t want houses. 
Go away.’ Whereas if it’s about the future, how are we going to build houses and how 
are you going to be able to afford to live there and your kids get a job there, then 
having the vision is really, really important. It’s a huge breakthrough, to focus on 
innovation and growth. (Senior Officer, OxonCC, 5 Nov 13) 
 
However, the corollary of this is that the structural challenge of housing was effectively 
sidelined. Indeed, interview evidence revealed the differentiated territorial agendas at play: 
OCC viewed the City-Deal process as a vehicle through which to promote its overall growth 
agenda, and thereby to force a comprehensive response to the city's housing crisis as a 
whole, while the surrounding districts, on the other hand, saw potential benefits for their 
own respective territories from a successful City-Deal bid, but would not countenance 
significant debate over existing housing allocations. The outcome, influenced considerably it 
would appear by officers at OxonCC, was a tactical move to divert away from the question 
of housing per se, effectively redefining the housing issue into one of economic growth, and 
resulting in a lack of coherence between the overall ambition of the City-Deal proposals and 
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the existing scale of housing allocations. A senior County Council officer summarised the 
position in interview, as follows: 
 
I can’t give you a housing number - housing is still tentative. Because it’s been moving 
so fast we haven’t been able to get clearance on this from the politicians. The City will 
say they’re getting towards an agreement for more housing, then the districts will say 
something different. What happens is that you have to get it so far down the line, and 
then the pressure builds, [central] Government says ‘we’ll do this and this for you’, and 
it starts to develop a credibility which means that the surrounding districts will then 
find it difficult to say no. Again, it’s partly because it derives from that overall vision – 
I mean, who doesn’t want a prosperous economy? (5 Nov 2013) 
 
Alongside the tendency to divert away from the housing issue, signs of political tension were 
evident more generally throughout the policy process. Though the City-Deal bid was 
eventually successful, not least, it would appear, because of the perception on the part of 
central government of the potential for knowledge-based growth in the county, several 
respondents were perfectly candid regarding underlying difficulties in working relationships 
between the various authorities. A senior district council officer remarked, for example: 
 
The City-Deal was a debacle. The Government representatives – one from BIS, one 
from Cabinet Office – well, I’ve never known Government reps be as honest as they 
were. After a few meetings where they just listened to us and watched the dynamics 
and the way we made decisions, they finally came out and said: “You’ve got to come 
up with your draft soon. We’re telling you now, don’t waste time on the draft that 
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you’ve got here, because Government believes that Oxfordshire doesn’t work together. 
All six of you authorities don’t get on. None of you are volunteering any money, any 
resources. You’ve been told that the only rule about City-Deals is that you can’t simply 
ask Government for more money, and all you are doing is asking for money. What part 
of this don’t you understand?!” I was saying ‘yes, you’re absolutely right’ and I was 
getting kicked under the table, but basically the County and the districts don’t all get 
on. Even when the Government arrives and says “we can really make Oxfordshire fly, 
we’re here to help you, because if Oxfordshire flies then the whole country flies. Ask 
us for something exciting”. But we couldn’t because we didn’t get on. That was the 
only reason. There were visionaries in the room, but they were thinking of their own 
organisation first, and not the whole region (13 March 2014) 
 
Lastly here, it is noteworthy that the governance arrangements which have emerged to take 
forward the City-Deal programme effectively further embed the existing governmental 
framework in Oxfordshire, rather than providing a mechanism to transcend the established 
policy impasse. City-Deals were introduced with the explicit intent to strengthen governance 
across functional economic areas, to facilitate effective leadership and to remove existing 
blockages. In some cases they have generated or extended significant governance change 
with new combined authorities taking responsibility for economic development, 
regeneration and transportation policies. However, Oxfordshire proposed a Joint Committee 
of the City-Deal partners to act as a ‘City-Deal Board’. The Local Authorities would invest 
powers in the City-Deal Board by virtue of representative membership, the Board 
comprising six local authority and six private sector representatives drawn from the wider 
Local Enterprise Partnership Board membership including the LEP chair, the University of 
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Oxford, research institutions and business interests. The Board would be chaired on a 
rotational basis by a local authority leader and was constituted explicitly to ‘ensure that 
decisions relating to the implementation of this proposal are binding on all parties, thereby 
bringing confidence to Government and the business community more widely that its 
ambitions will be delivered.’ However, some sense of the limits of joint working here may be 
gauged from OCC’s response to Cherwell District Council’s (CDC) Local Plan submission 
on 31st January 2014, which criticised CDC’s housing allocations made shortly prior to the 
SHMA recommendations which emerged in March: 
 
In failing to address the delivery of the objectively assessed [housing] need identified 
by the Oxfordshire SHMA, the Local Plan fails in its agreement with Government to 
meet the objectively assessed need set out in the Oxfordshire SHMA. This in turn fails 
to acknowledge the national interests and local requirements for economic growth as 
given in the City Deal, approved in January 2014 by CDC and all the Oxfordshire 
authorities, the LEP and Government Ministers 
 
In summary, then, the experience of the City-Deal in Oxford-Oxfordshire reflected strategic 
action on the part of key actors to manage contradictory policy agendas amongst the local 
authorities. The territorial foundations for this are clearly apparent. In the face of intractable 
opposition amongst the districts to the physical expansion of the city, OxonCC officers 
sought to find a way forward. The City-Deal bid was therefore framed explicitly around 
questions of innovation and economic growth in order to avoid the immediate conflict 
which would accompany any direct engagement with housing allocations. Political 
dissonance thus circumscribed the nature of the strategic response, ensuring that the key 
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issue of housing was effectively avoided, but resulting in an associated lack of specificity in 
the City-Deal proposal and ongoing conflict over the wider spatial strategy for the County. It 
was also the source of palpable tension in the policy process and in the limited scope of 
associated changes in governance forms. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have characterised urban political dissonance as a form of sustained, 
institutionalised conflict marked by contradictory visions and policy incongruity. Through a 
detailed case study in Oxford, U.K. we have sought to demonstrate how a distinctive pattern 
of territorial discrepancy has underpinned sustained patterns of conflict and tension, 
strategic action to delay, disrupt and reduce prospects for agreement, incoherent policy 
agendas, and an inability to find workable policy resolution. In setting out the overall 
lineaments of urban political dissonance we recognise, however, that the paper is necessarily 
limited both theoretically and empirically and would point to a number of areas for further 
development. From a conceptual standpoint, for example, there would seem to be 
significant potential for multi-layered analyses which seek connections between this 
distinctive urban political form and the wider dynamics of capital accumulation, as well as 
important interactions with regional and central state levels. Here there are clear parallels 
with earlier structuralist critiques of urban political theories, and with wider calls for a 
relational and multi-scalar reading of urban politics. More concretely, with regard to research 
design, the focus on framing here suggests much closer attention to questions of institutional 
perceptions, personality, and political manoeuvering and in turn points towards a deeper 
interrogation of strategic activity through more formal discourse-analytic techniques and 
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institutional ethnographies. Additionally as we have recognised above, there is a need for 
comparative analyses based on consistent conceptual foundations and rigorous methods in 
order to extend explanatory outcomes. 
 
One important implication of our analysis concerns the wider impact of such dissonant 
urban political forms on delivering economic development. Politics matters in urban 
development, even in post-political times. While the scope of political debate may indeed be 
narrowed, struggle over spatial strategy, policy emphases and associated delivery mechanisms 
is played out on a daily basis in many local political contexts. This may be reinforced by 
distinctively territorial dynamics as entrenched institutional positions, party political 
differences and individual personalities feed into established policy scleroses. The impacts 
may be real and highly significant; in January 2015, for example, The Economist reported that 
between 2008-9 and 2013-14 Cambridge added many more workers, highly educated 
residents and well-paid jobs than Oxford, and that Cambridge built 1,020 homes in 2014, 
while Oxford built 60 (Economist 2015). The implication, it was argued, is clear: ‘What the 
city, and the county, now need is someone to provide a strategic overview and then to bang 
heads together to push it through. None of the districts in Oxfordshire is big or powerful 
enough to do so’ (op cit, 2015). 
 
The focus on governance restructuring introduced here reflects an evolving emphasis in 
central government thinking, though we would also sound a note of caution regarding the 
limits of purely territorial restructuring. Over an extended period planning per se has been 
portrayed as a major barrier to economic growth in the U.K. and an extensive programme of 
reform and liberalisation has sought to streamline the planning system and redirect it in 
39 
 
favour of economic growth. Alongside this, however, important governance initiatives have 
recently been introduced designed to decentralise influence over economic growth, such as 
multi-area agreements in the later years of New Labour government and combined 
metropolitan authorities under the 2010-2015 Coalition and the current Conservative 
administration. However, as our analysis here clearly demonstrates the sources of delay may 
be as much political as administrative and bureaucratic. In the absence of commitment to 
clear policy change, therefore, ongoing streamlining and even governance restructuring may 
not necessarily engender policy reform, and hence might have little impact on an established 
impasse. Indeed, despite the focus on combined authorities in some of the larger 
metropolitan areas of England, the broad turn to localism under the Coalition Government 
from 2010 and the Conservative Government from 2015 may well have acted in other cases 
to license local political constraints and reinforce dissonant political forms. In this context 
the prospect for effectively ‘dealing with dissonance’ remains seemingly faraway. 
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Endnotes: 
 
1 Thanks for this specific wording are due to an anonymous referee 
 
2 For example, BRUMBERG (2001) examines dissonant politics in two contrasting Islamic 
contexts: Firstly, in Iran where efforts to liberalise the political system after the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 were effectively stymied by a competing institutional-ideological 
path controlled by Khomeini’s heir Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamanei and his allies in powerful 
state institutions; and secondly in Indonesia where political liberalisation and power sharing 
reflect Indonesia’s plural nature, but also a legacy of division between traditionalist and 
modernist Muslims manifest in ‘a politics of confrontation, brinkmanship, and negotiation 
among forces that have long advocated contending visions of community’ (BRUMBERG, 
2001: 408). Elsewhere, GLADE (2005) assesses developments within Mubarak’s Egypt 
which for three decades from 1981 fluctuated between democratic reform and hegemonic 
totalitarianism as the Egyptian government sought to maintain its monopoly on legitimate 
social and political interpretation. Lastly here, MUEHLBACHER (2008) discusses Lebanon 
as a dissonant nation embodying both ‘irreconcilable loyalties’ and ‘inter-communal 
coexistence’, such that it has been unable to construct a clearly definable identity. 
 
3 This perspective derives from the so-called ‘strategic-relational approach’ (SRA) introduced 
by Bob Jessop and Colin Hay (HAY 2002; HAY and JESSOP 1995; JESSOP 1990, 1997, 
2001) specifically in the sphere of state theory to explain that the state, as a social relation, is 
a historically contingent strategic terrain which is more responsive to some strategies than 
others. In theorising the actions of societal interests such a state-theoretical account 
emphasises the interaction of a dynamic context which privileges certain forms of interests 
52 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
and activities over alternative courses of action (or is ‘strategically selective’), and strategic 
actors who continually examine the options open to them in pursuing their various interests. 
Focus is directed, therefore, towards the dynamic interplay between the changing political-
economic and institutional context within which particular actors operate, and the 
perceptions, strategic calculations and action of those actors. 
 
4 Since the early 1970s OCC has been predominantly Labour-led, with majority control 
throughout from 1980-2000 and a mix of majority and minority leadership throughout most 
of the remaining years. In recent years there have been no elected Conservatives on the City 
Council at all, although two Liberal Democrat councillors briefly sat as Conservatives during 
2007–8. SODC, WODC, VOWH and CDC, have been predominantly Conservative-
controlled since their initial elections in 1973, though VOWH was controlled by the Liberal-
Democratic party for a significant period from 1995-2011 and CDC was briefly controlled 
by Labour, between 1996-98. OxonCC also has been largely Conservative-led, albeit under 
no overall control from 1985-2005. 
 
 
 
